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Population ageing in a small open economy – 
some policy experiments with a tractable general 
equilibrium model 
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This paper extends Gertler’s (1999) tractable overlapping generations model with 
life-cycle features by allowing for distortionary taxation, demographic transition 
and stochastic variation in demographic structure. The model is then used to study 
demographic change in the small open economy of Finland. Simulations highlight 
the key role played by labour market responses to ageing. When the responses of 
labour supply, wages, and hence private consumption, to higher taxation are 
consistently accounted for, population ageing has clearly much larger effects on 
public finance, when compared to mechanical sustainability calculations. 
Stochastic simulations suggest that lengthening of working time has only a 
modest alleviating effect on the fiscal burden of ageing. This is due to the fact that 
stochastic variation in the length of working time has only a relatively small effect 
on the model’s dependency ratio. Variation in life expectancy is clearly much 
more important. 
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Väestön ikääntyminen pienessä avotaloudessa – 
politiikkavaihtoehtojen tarkastelua yleisen tasapainon 
mallilla 
Suomen Pankin tutkimus 
Keskustelualoitteita 28/2006 
Juha Kilponen – Helvi Kinnunen – Antti Ripatti 




Tässä tutkimuksessa kehitetään edelleen Gertlerin (1999) sukupolvimallia siten, 
että verojen haittavaikutukset, ikärakenteen muutos sekä stokastinen vaihtelu ikä-
rakenteessa voidaan ottaa huomioon mallilaskelmissa. Kehitettyä mallia käytetään 
hyväksi arvioitaessa ikääntymisen kokonaistaloudellisia vaikutuksia Suomen 
kaltaisessa pienessä avotaloudessa. Laskelmat osoittavat, että kun ikääntymisen 
vaikutukset työn tarjontaan, palkkoihin ja yksityiseen kulutukseen otetaan 
huomioon, nämä vaikutukset julkisen talouden tasapainoon ovat selkeästi 
suuremmat kuin mekanistisissa kestävyysarvioinneissa yleensä. Stokastisissa 
simuloinneissa osoitetaan, että työuran pidentyminen lieventää vain hieman 
ikääntymisen luomaa painetta nostaa veroja. Tämä johtuu siitä, että vain 
suhteellisen pieni osa stokastisesta vaihtelusta mallin ikärakennemuuttujassa 
aiheutuu vaihtelusta työuran pituudessa. Vaihtelu eläkkeelläoloajassa on sen 
sijaan huomattavasti merkittävämpi tekijä. 
 
Avainsanat: ikääntyminen, yleinen tasapaino, julkinen talous, demografinen epä-
varmuus 
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Populations in most of the industrialised countries are ageing. Demographic
patterns are especially pronounced in some European economies where old-age
dependency ratio are set to rise considerably. The key factors behind this trend
are a slowdown of population growth and a substantial increase in longevity.
Many European countries have begun to prepare for demographic change. In
many European countries where tax rates are already at very high levels, an
additional ﬁscal burden on labour could have detrimental eﬀects on future
economic performance.
One of the main ideas for resolving the issue has been to design pension
reforms that increase incentives to work longer and/or to cut pension beneﬁts.
O n ep r o m i n e n te x a m p l ef r o mE u r o p ei sF i n l a n d ,w h e r et h ep e n s i o nr e f o r m
eﬀective from the start of 2005 introduced a ﬂexible retirement age of from 63
to 68. Under the latest pension reform, the pension level is now linked more
explicitly than before to exit age and thus with to contributions made by the
insured. This is expected to increase incentives to work longer. Furthermore,
starting from 2009, changes in life expectancy will eﬀect pension levels. In
addition, pension indexation has been changed so that all pensions will be
indexed using a weight of 0.8 for living costs and 0.2 for wages, in contrast to
the earlier ‘midway index’ applied up to age 65. This will contribute to some
erosion of the value of pensions compared to wage level in the future. The
latter reforms are clearly attempts to moderate the ﬁscal impact of growing
pension expenditures.
In this paper, we develop a tractable dynamic general equilibrium
macroeconomic model that allows us to account for demographic transition.
The model features dynamic optimization of a small open economy with
an internationally given real interest rate and a non-stochastic balanced
growth path determined by labour saving technological development and
population growth. Optimal consumption and labour supply decisions are
based on Gertler’s (1999) tractable overlapping generation model, extended
for distortionary taxes and time-varying retirement and death probabilities1.
Pensions are conditioned on aggregate wage level and on demographic trend,
and the model features a partially funded pension system. The funded part
of the pension system is considered contractual saving (assets accumulated by
the pension fund) and the PAYG part as a transfer from workers to pensioners.
These transfers are ﬁnanced by collecting pension contributions from ﬁrms and
workers. Finally, we quantify the uncertainty associated with demographic
projections, by allowing for stochastic variation in the key variables driving
demographic trends.
The results of simulations highlight the key role played by feedback eﬀects
from taxation in the assessment of economic costs of ageing. When the
responses of labour supply, real wages, and hence private consumption, to
higher taxation are consistently accounted for, the economy settles at a level
1Keuschnigg and Keuschnigg (2004), Ferrero (2005), Roeger (2005), Kara and Thadden
(2006), Fujivara and Teranish (2006), and Grafenhofer, Jaag, Keuschnigg and Keuschnigg
(2006) develop the Gertler (1999) model further and study diﬀerent aspects of population
ageing in their models.
7of taxation clearly above that generally estimated in mechanical sustainability
calculations. Even if the eﬀective retirement age were to increase as expected,
the burden from pension payments alone would cause the tax rate to rise to
a level above that witnessed in the worst years of Finland’s recession of the
mid-1990s. Results from stochastic simulations support this view, by showing
that a lengthening of working time has only a minor alleviating impact on
the ﬁscal burden of ageing: Only a small fraction of the stochastic variation
in an endogenously determined income tax rate is explained by the stochastic
variation in the length of working time. Finally, if the pension replacement
rate falls, as seems likely under the current pension regime, there would be
a much smaller increase in taxation in response to rising dependency ratio.
The average decline in the level of pensions relative to wage developments,
however, raises a concern that the falling purchasing power of pensions relative
to wage developments will exert pressure on other social security schemes. The
current pension scheme, which appears to be ﬁnancially sustainable, may thus
in practice generate costs to local and central government in the form of higher
expenditures on income support and other beneﬁts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
model, including a description of the pension system. Sections 4—6 discuss the
results from various policy experiments including a sensitivity analysis and
stochastic simulations. Section 7 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
2.1 General features
The model developed in this paper features dynamicoptimization of a
small open economy with an internationally given real interest rate and
non-stochastic balanced growth path. On the balanced growth path, economic
growth is determined by exogenously given growth of labour-saving technology
and population.
Households’ saving decisions, and hence accumulation of ﬁnancial assets,
are inﬂuenced by households’ desire to smooth consumption over time.
Individuals are expected to have ﬁnite lives consisting of two distinct periods.
Following Gertler (1999), we label the households living in these two diﬀerent
periods ‘workers’ and ‘retirees’.
The likelihood that a worker will lose part of his labour income at
retirement, induces her to discount the future income stream at a higher rate
than otherwise. This reduces consumption and increases saving. In this sense,
workers save for a rainy day and for retirement.2 The planning horizon of
pensioners is shorter than that of workers due to the periodic probability of
2This view is generally consistent with the study of Gourinchas and Parker (2002),
who ﬁnd that empirically observed saving patterns accord with forward-looking optimizing
behaviour in a life-cycle setup with income uncertainty. Their study suggests that the
precautionary saving motive in early life implies that between 60 and 70 per cent of
non-pension wealth is due to precautionary saving
8death. Therefore pensioners’ propensity to consume out of wealth is greater
than that of the working-age population.
In order to capture changing labour supply incentives of the elderly, we
assume that ‘retirees’ participate in the labour markets. However, compared
to workers, their labour eﬃciency is lower. Lower labour eﬃciency can capture
issues such as part-time work and possibly lower productivity. A more general,
elastic labour supply allows demographic change to feed into adjustment of
capital and investment via the capital-labour substitution eﬀect.
Individuals receive transfers from both the central government and pension
funds. However, in order to maintain analytical tractability, pensions
are related to the prevailing aggregate wage level, and not to individual
characteristics3. The pension system is characterised as partially funded. We
consider the funded part of the pension system contractual saving (assets
accumulated by the pension fund) and the PAYG part as a transfer from
workers to pensioners. These transfers are ﬁnanced by collecting pension
contributions from ﬁrms and workers as noted above.
The model is closed by ﬁscal rules. Given that we distinguish between
central government and the pension fund, one ﬁscal rule determines the
pension fund’s long-term net lending rate, while the other determines the
central government ‘debt ratio’. Supply side (production structure) is based
on CES production technology with factor augmentation in the underlying
technological progresses and nominal and real rigidities.
2.2 Demographics
Consumers are assumed to be born as workers. Conditional on being a worker
in the current period, the probability of remaining one in the next period is
ωt, while the probability of retiring is 1−ωt. These transition probabilities are
independent of individuals’ employment tenure, so that the average tenure of
working is 1
1−ωt. In order to allow for non-stationary demographic structure,
we subindex the probabilities with t. Once an individual has retired she faces
a periodic probability of death of (1−γt). Given that the survival probability
γt is assumed to be independent of retirement tenure, but that it may depend
on calendar time, the average retirement period at each point of time is 1
1−γt.
Allowing for time variation in the retirement and death probabilities enables us
to generate demographic ‘shocks’ that feed into the dependency ratio gradually
rather than instantly.
3In contrast to large scale overlapping generations models, such as Auerbach-Kottlikoﬀ
(1987), we do not follow individual cohorts within the two age groups. This limits our ability
to model the demographic change and pensions y s t e mi nav e r yd e t a i l e dm a n n e r .W ea l s o
need to abstract from many other potential sources of heterogeneity in consumption and
labour supply behaviour, such as diﬀering educational levels. However, we can still specify
the retirement and death probabilities, as well as the growth rate of working-age population,
in such a way that demographic transition can be captured with reasonable accuracy at the
aggregate level. Similarly, linking pensions to demographics, we can roughly mimic the
associated trends in pensions and public expenditures.
9Let Nw
t denote the stock of workers alive at time t. We then assume that ¡
1 − ωt+1 + nw
t+1
¢
new workers are born at t +1 . This implies that we can set

















t+1. Given age-independent probabilities of retirement and
death and that cohorts are large, the retiree population (Nr










t refers to the stock of retirees population at time t.W i t h s o m e




















Deﬁning the stock of whole population as Nt = Nw
t + Nr
t , we can express the
growth rate for the whole population as a function of retiree to worker ratio















In the steady state the demographic change has ended, so that
ϕ =
1 − ω
ˆ N − γ
(2.5)
ˆ N = ˆ N




A household’s preferences are expressed recursively using the constant
elasticity aggregator
Vt =[ {u(Ct,l t)}






Vt is the value function, and β gives the subjective time preference. The
parameter ρc < 1 captures intertemporal substitution. A special case of μ =
1, applied here, corresponds to a type of risk neutrality where agents are
indiﬀerent regarding risk but retain a non-trivial preference for the time at
which consumption occurs (cf. Farmer, 1990)4. This special case is analytically
4Assumption of risk-neutrality is important. For instance, analysis of welfare eﬀects of
social security reforms are importantly aﬀected by the treatment of risk. A mandatory
social security system imposes an implicit tax on households, so that there is a reduction
in expected life-cycle income (due to social security contributions). However, if the social
security system reduces the variance of life-cycle income by pooling the income risk between
young and old generation, there is potentially a tradeoﬀ between a reduction in expected
life-cycle income and the variability: The reduction of welfare due to mandatory social
security would then be lower for risk-averse households than for risk-neutral ones.
10tractable, since it generates linear decision rules even with (idiosyncratic) risk
to income, asset return and length of life. In addition to risk neutrality and a
recursive structure of preferences, we assume that individuals enjoy utility from
consumption, Ct, as well as leisure, (1−lt), according to the utility functional
u(Ct,l t)=C
v
t (1 − lt)
1−v. (2.8)
where v is the elasticity of period utility with respect to consumption.
Taking into account the two distinct periods of life, as well as retiring and



















t+1 +( 1− ωt)V
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t+1,β





t = βγt. (2.10)
z = w,r indicates whether the individual is a worker or retiree respectively.
The willingness to smooth consumption over time implies a ﬁnite (constant)
intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ =1 /(1 − ρc). The retirees eﬀective
discount factor β
r is adjusted to take into account the periodic probability of
death. We assume a perfect annuities market in order to eliminate the impact
of uncertainty about time of death: A retiree’s remaining wealth at death is
invested in a mutual fund, which invests it in the available ﬁnancial assets in
each period of time. Those surviving to the following period each receive a
return that is proportional to his contribution to the fund. For instance, if
Rt is the gross return per unit invested by the fund, the gross return for a
surviving retirees is at time t Rt/γt.
Workers, in turn, face the risk of decline in wage income at retirement.
However, since an individual’s preferences are over the mean of the next
period’s value function, only a desire the smooth consumption over time will
aﬀect the consumption pattern in the face of idiosyncratic income risk. Thus
a worker simply forms a certainty equivalent of his random utility, as shown
in equation (2.9).
2.3.2 Retirees
Ar e t i r e eb o r na tt i m ej and retiring at time k, and who survives at least until

















































denotes pensions, and ξ<1 is the labour eﬃciency of retirees with respect
to workers. Pc
t is a price index of consumption, to be determined later. tt is
the total labour income tax rate including pension contribution rate, tWP
t ,t o
be discussed later. From the ﬁrst order condition for labour, we ﬁrst derive a












Solving the retiree’s maximization problem with respect to consumption, using















t denote discounted after-tax values of labour income and pensions,





















.( 2 . 1 6 )
Since total social security payments (pensions) are distributed equally among
retirees, the gross growth rate of retirees ˆ Nr
t+1 enters into the discount factor.
The discount factor for human wealth is similarly augmented by ˆ Nr
t+1.A
retiree’s marginal propensity to consume out of wealth  tπt evolves according
to the following non-linear diﬀerence equation


























t . A retiree’s marginal propensity to consume varies with
the real interest rate Rt+1/ ˆ Pc
t+1 as well as with expected changes in real net
wage income. Due to the fact that survival probability can vary over calendar
time, it inﬂuences on retiree’s eﬀective discount rate and introduces additional
dynamics into the marginal propensity to consume equation.
As in the standard Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985) models, likelihood
of death (1−γt) in (2.17) raises the retirees’ marginal propensity to consume.
This can be seen easily by considering a limiting case of logarithmic preferences
(σ → 1) and when survival probability is constant. In this case
 π =1− βγ (2.18)
122.3.3 Workers




































t denotes ﬁnancial transfers to working age and tt is the total labour income











Intertemporal maximization in turn gives rise to a fairly complicated Euler












πt is a worker’s marginal propensity to consume and Hw
t and Sw
t denote her
human and social security wealth. Marginal propensity to consume out of
wealth is a non-linear ﬁrst order diﬀerence equation
πt =1−
µ

















where Ωt+1 is the factor that weights the gross real return Rt+1/ ˆ Pc
t+1.T h i s
















 t+1 > 1is the ratio of a retiree’s marginal propensity to consume to that
of a worker. The enlarged discount rate due to the presence of Ωt+1 > 1
in the denominator of (2.25)—(2.26) means that workers value human wealth
and social security less than in the inﬁnite horizon case. This in turn tends
reduce worker’s consumption and increase saving. Importantly, notice also
that distortionary taxes increase the workers’ discount factor.
Hw
t in (2.22) is a discounted sum of worker’s wage bill (in net terms) and Sw
t
is the sum across workers alive at t of the capitalized value of social security
(in net terms). Both of these measures take into account of corresponding



































































t+1 are the values of human wealth and social security for
a working retiree who retired at time t +1but was still working at time
t.T h e f a c t o rˆ Nw
t+1 augments the discount rate of the capitalized value of
a worker’s social security because with ﬁnite lives, the share of total social
security entitlements going to those currently alive declines over time as the
working-age population grows. By similar argument, ˆ Nw
t+1 enters into the
discount factor of human wealth.5
2.4 Distribution of wealth and aggregate consumption
Given our assumptions on preferences and population dynamics, there is no
need to keep track of how assets and consumption are distributed within
the groups of retirees and workers. However, since marginal propensities
to consume diﬀer as between the two groups, we must keep track of the
distribution of assets between the two groups. Consequently, we need a state












At+1 be the share of ﬁnancial assets held by workers. It can be














t + T r








Aggregate private consumption can then be obtained simply by summing up
























5Note that in the limiting case of logarithmic preferences (σ → 1) marginal propensity
to consume is constant and equal to 1 − β.
142.5 Assets
There are several types of ﬁnancial assets available for consumers: domestic
government bonds AS
t , foreign bonds AW
t , and stocks issued by domestic ﬁrms
AF
t . In addition, it is assumed that all the assets accumulated by the pension
fund A
p
t are hold by domestic consumers.
Domestic one-period bonds pay a nominal return rt, while the gross return
on stocks is determined according to the proﬁts of the ﬁrms in the model.
Foreign bonds pay a return rF
t , which is exogenously given. The arbitrage
condition equates ex ante returns of domestic and foreign bonds, to give rise to
uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition. The share price is the nominal
price (ex-dividend) of a unit of equity in period t. The factor deﬁning the gross
return on stocks is the ﬁrms’ ΠD













t denotes the corporate tax rate. Optimal consumption plans can be
combined with the arbitrage equation for holding diﬀerent assets. This yields


















St denotes the nominal exchange rate, rS
t denotes domestic short-term nominal
interest rate and rF
t denotes corresponding foreign short term interest rate. tS
t
is tax rate at source. The latter is a standard UIP condition. In addition
to this, we assume an exogenously determined risk-premium kt vs. domestic
bonds for stocks issued by the domestic ﬁrms.
2.6 Labour markets
The model features nominal wage rigidity in the form of quadratic adjustment
costs. A worker faces quadratic adjustment if when it has been allowed to
re-set her wage. For those not able to optimize in period t, the wage is adjusted
using the steady state growth rate of wages. This steady state growth rate of
wages, denoted d¯ w, equals steady state productivity growth plus inﬂation. The
behaviour of aggregate nominal wages is then characterized by the following













(1 − q)βd¯ w
(1 + β(1 − q)2d¯ w2)
EtWt+1 +
(1 − q)d¯ w
(1 + β(1 − q)2d¯ w2)
Wt−1 (2.33)
+
q(1 − (1 − q)βd¯ w2)






t is consumption of workers, Nw
t is worker population, Lw
t denotes
the number of workers demanded, q ∈ (0,1) is the exogenous probability that
determines how often a randomly chosen worker is allowed to re-set her wage.
The equation for optimal wage W∗
t is derived directly from the aggregate
version of worker’s labour supply decision.
Given that workers’ and retirees’ labour eﬃciency diﬀer, we deﬁne






Here ξ ∈ (0,1) denotes the relative eﬃciency of a unit of retirees’ labour.
Labour demand for workers Lw
t is derived from (2.34) by assuming that retirees
are always on their labour supply curve at prevailing wage (W), and that the
domestic intermediate goods producer is always on its labour demand curve.
2.7 Public sector
The general government (public sector) is divided into two sectors, labelled
state (central government) and pension funds. The state collects taxes on
labour income at the rate tWS
t from capital gains at tK
t and from consumption
at tC
t . The state consumes CS
t and pays transfers to workers and to retirees.
In the budget constraint these total transfers are denoted T S
t . In addition,
the state issues one-period government bonds amounting to AS
t and paying a
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+ t
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t (total net transfers)
− rtA
S
t−1 (interest payments) (2.35)
2.8 Fiscal policy rule
Typically, models like this are closed by either a tax rule or by a lump sum
transfer rule. We use a rather general form of tax rule that stabilizes the
evolution of government debt via labour income tax. Formally, the tax rule







t−1 − ¯ τ
ws)+θ2(A
S
t − ¯ A
S)/Yt (2.36)
6See eg Railavo (2004) for discussion of alternative ﬁscal policy rules and their stability
properties.
16The tax rule has two attractors ¯ τ and ¯ AS/Yt towards which the tax, and
consequently the debt to output ratio are stabilized. Benchmark values for
the parameters θ1 and θ2 have been calibrated to 0.3 and 0.1 respectively. ¯ τ
and ¯ AS/Y can be set such that the public debt to output ratio reach wanted
steady state values.
2.9 Statutory pension fund
There are several motivations for considering the pension fund(s) separately
from the central government. First, when the pension scheme is deﬁned beneﬁt
and partly funded, we should consider the funded part of the pension system
as contractual saving, as opposed to discretionary saving, while the PAYG
part should be considered a direct transfer from young generation (workers)
to old generation (pensioners).7 In Finland, where approximately 25% of the
pensions are funded both features are quantitatively important.
Second, pension contributions are considered at least partly as taxes.
Analogously with the previous section, this means that the way in which the
increasing ﬁscal burden of aging is ﬁnanced along the demographic transition
path is of crucial importance for the economy’s labour market responses to
ageing. The tradeoﬀ is clearly between proportions of demographic transition
ﬁnanced by changing the pension fund asset position and by changing the
contribution rates.8
Accordingly, we assume that the economy’s pension fund are administrated
separately from the central government. The fund collects pension
contributions from the private sector and distributes pensions to retirees
totalling T PR
t . Pension funds accumulate ﬁnancial assets AP
t .I ne a c hp e r i o d ,



















t is overall pension contribution rate, consisting of
employer and employee contributions. Finally T PR
t denotes pensions and other
transfers from pension funds to retirees.
7In Finland, approximately 25% of the pensions are funded.
8A third important consideration is that pension funds hold the savings for the households
that are completely illiquid. Households are thus not able to borrow, or are limited to a
small amount, against their savings accumulated in the pension funds. This means that
households do not see pensions accumulated in pension funds as perfect substitutes for more
liquid forms of saving, such as bonds and equity. This is supported by empirical ﬁndings
according to which growth in partially funded pension schemes does boost personal saving,
but not one-to-one. The current version of the model, however, does not address this issue.
172.10 Contribution rule
Inter-generational distribution of the ﬁscal burden of ageing is not actively
managed by institutional control built into current pension schemes in
general. According to Fenge and Werding (2003) ‘it merely just happens’.
Consequently, inter-generational distribution is hardly an issue in devising
the contribution rule for a model like ours. In a deﬁned beneﬁtp e n s i o n
system, such as in Finland, the contribution rate is adjusted to maintain the
pension fund’s ﬁscal balance. One way to write the pension fund’s contribution
rule, is to assume that the contribution rule stabilizes the net lending-to-total
wage ratio at some predetermined long-run level.9 Consequently, we write a
simple ‘net lending’ rule that stabilizes the net lending-to-total-wages ratio at














WL is the target level for net lending-to-total-wages and θ3 is
an adjustment parameter. This form is ﬂexible enough for policy option
experiments. For instance setting ¯ AP at zero and θ3 high represents a pure
PAYG system. In our benchmark simulations, we set θ =0 .15 and ¯ AP =0 .07.
2.11 Pension expenditures
Allowing idiosyncratic historical dependence in social security and pension
payments would make the model more realistic, but it would sacriﬁce analytical
tractability. We thus link the model’s pension expenditures/transfers to the






where μt =¯ et/ ¯ W is the average pension rate evaluated at the initial steady
state level of aggregate wages ¯ W.S i n c et h ew a g er a t eWt is endogenous, we
obtain projections for pension expenditures once we set a deterministic path
to average pension rate μt. Total pension expenditures T R
t are thus linked to
average wages and number of pensioners in the model. Furtheremore, making
use of our demographic assumptions, we can express pension expenditures per













T h es u p p l ys i d ei sb a s e do nas i n g l ei n t e r m e d i a t eg o o dt h a tc a nb eu s e d
in the production of ﬁnal goods. Producers of this intermediate goods
9Indeed, in Finland, pension funds’ total net lending relative to aggregate wages has been
rather stable during the last 25 years.
18combine capital and labour using a constant-elasticity-of- substitution (CES)
production function and operate in monopolistic product markets. Prices
of ﬁnal goods are sticky in the form of Calvo-pricing. Domestic producers
of intermediate products purchase their capital inputs (capital services) in
a competitive capital market (from companies providing capital services) in
which capital is freely sold and transferable for use by other companies.
Building up new capital generates cost — adjustment costs — in the form of
lost capital stock.
Domestic intermediate goods are combined with imported intermediate
goods to produce ﬁnal goods of three kinds: consumption goods, capital goods
and exported goods. The production function — or, rather, aggregator — is CES.
The production diﬀers across ﬁnal goods in terms of elasticity of substitution.
All three types of ﬁnal producers operate in competitive product markets, in
which they take the market price for their products as given in their own
decision-making.
Finally, nominal import prices are assumed to be sticky in a manner
corresponding to domestic intermediate goods prices. It is also assumed that,
i nt h es h o r tr u ne x c h a n g er a t ep a s s - t h r o u g ht oi m p o r tp r i c e si si n c o m p l e t e .
This is due to the fact that a ﬁxed portion of importing companies price their
products in the local currency.
2.12.1 Domestic intermediate goods producer
The domestic composite intermediate good, Yt, is produced according to a
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function, which combines










The parameter ρz ∈ [−1,∞) determines the elasticity of substitution 1/(1+ρz).


















Domestic intermediate goods, Yt(j), are produced by producers operating in
m o n o p o l i s t i cm a r k e t . T h ep r o d u c t i o nt e c h n o l o g ya n dt h ef a c t o ra u g m e n t i n g
technical trends are exogenously given. The production function is of the CES
















10Jalava, Pohjola, Ripatti and Vilmunen (2006) provide evidence that this may be a
reasonable approximation for the Finnish post-WWII data.




t denote time-varying11 capital and labour-augmenting
technical progress respectively. The elasticity of technical substitution is given
by 1/(1+ρ),w h e r eρ is the substitution parameter and δ the share parameter
in the production function. The technical change is labour-augmenting, ΛL
t ,
in the balanced growth path.


























where Rt denotes the nominal rental price of capital services and WF
t =
(1 + tF
t )Wt represents nominal labour costs including employers’ pension and
social security contributions. In the steady-state prices P(j) are determined
by markup, Υ(= − 1
ρz) over marginal costs
P(j)=ΥMC(j) (2.41)
The ﬁrst order conditions (in logs) with respect to capital services and labour
are given by
rt − pt =l o gδ − log(Υ) − ρlogΛ
K
t +( 1+ρ)(yt − kt) (2.42)
w
F
t − pt =l o g ( 1− δ) − log(Υ) − ρlogΛ
L
t +( 1+ρ)(yt − lt). (2.43)
D u et ot h em o n o p o l i s t i cc o m p e t i t i o ni nt h em a r k e tf o ro u t p u t ,t h es l o p eo ft h e
demand curve, υ ≡ log(Υ), enters into both ﬁrst order conditions.
T h ed y n a m i c so ft h ep r i c el e v e lPt(j) of producer j arise from the
assumption that a ﬁrm changes its price level when it receives a random
‘price-change signal’. A constant probability of receiving a price change signal
is given by 1 − ζ (ζ ∈ [0,1]). Since there is a continuum of intermediate
producers, 1−ζ also represents the share of producers that have received such
a signal and thus are able to change their prices. The average time between
price changes is given by 1/(1 − ζ).S o l v i n g t h e ﬁrst order condition and
linearizing in a standard way yields the following aggregate pricing equation
for the intermediate goods producer
∆pt = βEt∆pt+1 +
(1 − ζ)(1 − ζβ)
ζ
[υ + mct − pt]. (2.44)
Inﬂation is determined by expected inﬂation and log markup υ over the real
marginal costs mct − pt.
2.12.2 Capital rental ﬁrms
Capital is a homogeneous factor of production that is owned by a ﬁrm that
rents capital to producers of domestic intermediate goods. It operates under
11See Ripatti and Vilmunen (2001) for further discussion of their properties and estimates
using aggregate Finnish data.
20perfect competition. Physical capital accumulation generates real adjustment
costs in the form of lost capital stock. Capital accumulation is given by
K
p












t−1 (1 − δK) (2.45)
where S(·) denotes the adjustment costs of physical capital stock and δK is










subject to the capital accumulation equation (2.45) and the deﬁnition of capital
services,12 Kt = K
p
t−1. Its momentary proﬁts are given by
Π
K



















t−1 (1 − δK)
¢
(2.47)
The price index of investment goods, PI
t , is the price index of the domestic
investment good retailer and Rt denotes rental rate for capital. Future proﬁts




t+s].T h eﬁrst order condition with respect to
capital stock K
p

















































Due to the end-of-period timing of physical capital stock, the accumulated
physical capital is in use in the following period. Hence, the expected following
period’s rental rate Rt+1 governs the current period investment decision. The















The usual ‘investment equation’ can be obtained by substituting the
parametric version of adjustment costs into the ﬁrst order condition.
2.12.3 Production of ﬁnal goods
The economy is inhabited by two retailers that produce ﬁnal goods, one
producing consumer goods and the other capital goods. They combine
domestic intermediate inputs, produced by intermediate goods producers, and
12For simplicity we assume that capital services obtains a lagged value of physical capital
stock. In a more general case by Ripatti and Vilmunen (2004) capital services depend also
on the endogenous utilization rate. This extension alters the results only in business cycle
frequencies and is thus beyond the interest of this study.
21imported goods and services, and operate under perfect competition. The
demand for retailers’ output is given by consumption and investment of the
private and general government sectors. The output of the consumption-goods




t . The capital-goods retailer faces similar demand
comprising private sector and public sector investment, IT
t ≡ It + IS
t .T h e





















j is the respective share parameter and ρj the respective substitution
parameter (σj =1 /(1 + ρj). Mj denotes imports and Y j the domestic
intermediate good. Cost minimization generates following price indices,
P
j

























































The consumption-goods retailer pays the indirect taxes, tC
t . Hence the tax base
for indirect taxes consists of private consumption and government purchases.
No indirect taxes are levied on investment goods.
The elasticity of substitution between imported consumption goods and
domestic intermediate products has been estimated by Ripatti and Vilmunen
(2004). Using cointegration techniques they ﬁnd that ˆ ρ
C = −0.7731 (standard
error 0.049) implying elasticity of substitution of 4.4. δ
C is calibrated at 0.87.
The estimation of elasticity of substitution between imported investment goods
and domestic intermediate goods suggests a value of 2.2,w h i c hi sg i v e nb yt h e
estimate of ˆ ρ
I = −0.538 (standard error 0.183) .T h i sm e a n st h a tt h ef a c t o r s
are gross-substitutes. The calibrated value of the share parameter δ
I is 0.67.
The exporter is a ﬁrm that combines domestic intermediate inputs Y X
t and
imported raw materials MR
t toproduce export goodXt in competitive markets.
Technology and preferences are identical to those of the retailers. Ripatti
and Vilmunen (2004) assume that the imported-raw-materials-augmenting
technical change may contain a deterministic linear time trend. This trend
captures the structural change in input usage of exports. The estimate of the
elasticity of substitution is 0.45, implying that ρX =1 .217 (standard error
0.378). Not surprisingly, the point estimate suggests that the imported raw
materials and the domestic intermediate input are gross-complements in the
production of exported goods and services. The calibrated value of the share
parameter δ
X is 0.51.
13We abstract from the time-varying factor augmenting technical progress, which reﬂects
changes in preferences for domestic and imported intermediate goods.
222.12.4 Importing ﬁrms
Imported goods and services are used by the retailers and the exporter.
They combine imported and domestically produced intermediate goods to
produce ﬁnal consumption, capital and exported goods. The consumer
goods and services (including 5 per cent of imported energy) are used by
the consumption-goods retailer, capital goods and services are used by the
capital-goods retailer, and the exporter uses energy and intermediate goods in
producing exported goods. Both retailers operate under perfect competition in
the output markets. A model for import prices of imports by main use, ie for
the retailer sector, is derived by via the approach of Betts and Devereux (1996)
and (2000) applied to the Finnish aggregate import data by Freystätter (2003).
A portion of importers price their products in local (Finnish) currency and the
other importers in producers’ own currencies. Their pricing contains identical
frictions in the form of Calvo (1983b), ie they can change their price only if
a random price-change-signal is received. Their marginal costs are identical.
The aggregation of pricing behaviour over these two types of importers yields
an import-price Euler equation where import prices depend on expected future
import price inﬂation, current and expected future changes in foreign exchange
rates, and on importers’ real marginal costs. This brings incomplete exchange
rate pass-through into the model.14
2.13 Market equilibrium
All markets are in equilibrium at all point of times. The capital goods market
is in equilibrium when the supply of capital services by the capital-rental
ﬁrm equals the demand for capital services by intermediate goods producers.
Similarly the labour markets are in equilibrium when the demand for labour
equals its supply, Ls
t = LD
t . In the intermediate goods sector, the demand for







t = Yt. (2.50)























t is the aggregated export price of competing economies and MW
t is
aggregate imports of export markets. When market clearing conditions hold,
the workers’ and pensioners’ budget constraints (2.12) and (2.20), the general
14As incomplete exchange rate pass-through is not essential for the ageing simulations
provided in this paper, we abstract from explicit derivation. Derivation is provided in
Ripatti and Viertola (2004).
23government budget constraint (2.35) and the pension fund’s budget constraint
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trade balance
(2.52)
The current account balance is given by St(AW
t −AW





3.1 An overview of the pension system and pension reform in
Finland
The model developed above will be used to study population ageing and policy
experiments in the small open economy of Finland. First, we set out the Finnsh
pension scheme and pension reform eﬀective since 2005.
The pension scheme in Finland is deﬁned beneﬁti nt h es e n s et h a tp e n s i o n
beneﬁts are not directly dependent on contributions of workers to employment
pension schemes or/and the yields of pension funds. Instead, of total beneﬁts
being changed, it has been contribution rates that have been altered in response
to possible shortfalls in the balance. When there has been a danger of a
shortfall in the agreed funding rate, the level of contributions has been raised.
The second general feature of the Finnish system is the negligible role of
private and occupational pension schemes of private ﬁrms. Nearly all old age
pensions are provided by employment pension institutions or national pension
institutions closely controlled by the state.
The latest reform, eﬀective from the start of 2005, changed the pension
system in line with more actuarial principles. With the introduction of ﬂexible
retirement age, 63 to 68, the level of pensions becomes linked more explicitly
than before with exit age and thus with contributions made by the insured.
Furthermore, starting from 2009, changes in life expectancy will have an eﬀect
on pension levels. In addition, pension indexation has been changed so that all
pensions will be indexed using weights of 0.8 for living costs and 0.2 for wages,
whereasbefore a ‘midway index’ was applied up to age 65. This will contribute
to a comparative erosion in pension values, and thus to a decline in the pension
replacement ratio μ, compared to wage level. Contributions are collected
from employers and employees. Currently, 16.8% is collected on average
from employers and 4.6 % from employees. It has been agreed that further
changes in contribution rates will be shared equally (50-50) between employers
and employees. Due to the beneﬁt-based nature of the Finnish employment
pension system, long-term aggregate pension expenditure can be approximated
simply from demographic factors and parameters determining average pension
beneﬁts. The most important factors are naturally demographic trends and the
average age at which people start to draw pensions, which together determine
the total number of pensioners. The average level of pensions is aﬀected
by wage levels and the pension index, and thus by consumption prices and
24productivity developments. In addition, changes in life expectancy will have
an eﬀect on level of beneﬁts so that the replacement rate became dependent
on exit age.
3.2 Model’s calibration — initial steady state
For the purpose of simulating the model, the quantity variables are de-trended
by the labour-augmenting technical factor ΛL, population Nt and the
numeraire price level Pt. As for labour market variables, the nominal wage is
scaled by the labour augmenting technical change ΛL and consumption deﬂator
PC
t . Labour supply indices are scaled by population Nt. Finally, all the other
price variables are de-trended by the numeraire price level Pt.
In order to set up the model for demographic simulations and policy
experiments, we assume that the economy is initially in the steady state.
The economy is growing on the balanced growth path and the demographic
structure is stable. The model’s key parameters are then calibrated to reﬂect
the main features of the Finnish economy. The key parameters are calibrated
so that the key ‘great ratios’, factor shares, participation rates, demographic
structure as well as ﬁscal variables reﬂect the situation in the Finnish economy
on average during the last 10 years. The parameters of the production
functions were estimated using cointegration methods (Johansen, 1995), and
the parameters related to capital stock adjustment costs, depreciation function
and import prices are estimated using GMM.15 Tables (1)—(4) characterize
the calibration of some of the key parameters and resulting values of the key
endogenous variables. We next comment on the calibration of key parameters.
In order to ﬁt the participation rates observed we set the relative eﬃciency
of retirees at roughly 30%. Elasticity of periodic utility with respect to
consumption was at 0.8 and inter-temporal elasticity of substitution at 0.4.
The public-ﬁnance literature tends to use values well below unity for the
inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, while the RBC literature prefers large
value of σ. Typically, smaller value of σ makes the economy react more strongly
to ﬁs c a ls t i m u l u s( t a b l e1 ) .
Reﬂecting a calibrated value of periodic utility of consumption, the value for
t h eF r i s c he l a s t i c i t yo fl a b o u rs u p p l yf o rw o r k e r si si nl i n ew i t hi n t e r n a t i o n a l
microeconomic studies, which report the values of 0.15—0.32.16 Kuismanen
(2005a, 2005b) has also estimated compensated labour supply elasticities using
Finnish Labor Force survey data. Depending on the data sample and methods
used, his estimates range from 0.08 to 0.30. The distribution of wealth between
working-age and elderly persons seems reasonable in light of the demographic
structure: 17 per cent of the model economy’s total ﬁnancial wealth is owned
by retirees. Ω is an additional factor that multiplies the worker’s discount
factor. This additional discount factor is clearly higher than those obtained in
Gertler (1999). The diﬀerence is largely explained by the distorting nature of
15For detailed description of estimation strategies, see Ripatti and Vilmunen (2004).
16Bayomi, Laxton and Pesenti (2004) use the value 0.33 in the standard calibration of
GEM for the euro area.
25taxes. Similarly, retirees marginal propensity to consume is ‘only’ 60% higher
than that of the workers.17
Variable Explanation Value
β subjective discount factor, parameter 0.99
v elasticity of periodic utility with respect to consumption 0.80
σ Inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, parameter 0.45
ξ Labour eﬃciency of retirees, parameter 0.30
  Relative marginal propensity to consume, variable 1.59
π Worker’s marginal propensity to consume, variable 0.019
λ
F Distribution of ﬁnancial asset wealth, variable 0.17
Ω Additional discounting factor 1.10
¯ νw Frisch elasticity of labour supply (workers), variable 0.26
¯ νr Frisch elasticity of labour supply (pensioners), variable 0.23
Table 1: Calibration of key demand side parameters
Regarding parameters aﬀecting most strongly to pension system and
demographic structure, we assume that individuals work on average 43 years
and stay in retirement for about 15 years. Annual growth rate of working
age population is set at 0.18% per annum (table 2). The steady state retiree
worker ratio then amounts to 33 per cent, in accord with recent data The
pension rate is calibrated at 0.55, which, given endogenous average wage and
demographic structure means, that pension expenditures amount to 20% per
cent of total wages, also roughly in accord with recent data. Finally, the
pension contribution rate to employees is 3.9 per cent, while the employees’
contribution rate amounts to 15.4 per cent, so that overall pension contribution
rate is 19.3 per cent.
Variable Explanation Value
1
1−γ Expected time of retirement, in years, parameter 14.8
1
1−ω Expected time of working, in years, parameter 43.1
ˆ Nw Annual growth rate of working age %, parameter 0.18
ϕ Old age dependency ratio, variable 0.33
τWP Pension contribution rate of the workers %, implicit 3.9
τFP Pension contribution rate of the ﬁrms %, parameter 15.4
T R Pensions, % of wage sum, variable 20.5
μ Pension rate 0.55
Table 2: Calibration of key parameters of the pension system
Regarding public sector (excluding pension fund) it is assumed that the steady
state debt to output ratio is 60 percent, while total public consumption
17We assume that average expected time between price changes is 5 quarters, while wage
changes occur on average only every 8 quarters. In comparison to the literature, wage
changes occur seldom, but the values reﬂect the Finnish centralized wage setting system
and the fact that centralized wage contracts are usually set for 1—2 years time in Finland.
Similarly, the Calvo parameter for prices is on the high side.
26amounts to 20.8 percent of output (table 3). Total social security transfers to
workers are 6.4 percent of output. Finally labour income tax rate is calculated
endogenously so as to satisfy the state’s budget constraint, while the rest of
the tax parameters have been set exogenously reﬂecting the current tax system
in Finland.
Variable Explanation Value
κ Fiscal rule adjustment, parameter 0.1
aS Debt (% of output), variable 60.0
τWS Income tax rate % of workers, implicit 30.2
τK Corporate tax rate %, parameter 19.2
τC Indirect tax rate %, parameter 21.0
τFS Firm’s social security contribution rate, parameter 4.0
cS Public consumption (% of output), variable 20.8
T SW Total transfers to workers (% of output), variable 6.4
Table 3: Calibration of key parameters of the state
Regarding the supply side of the economy, we assume that the real interest rate
is about 2.4 per cent per annum (table 4). The economy grows on the balanced
growth path at the rate of 2.3 per cent per annum, reﬂecting the labour-saving
technical change and steady state growth rate of the population. Given the
small size of Finland in the euro area, the feedback from Finnish economy to
euro area level is very modest. Thus a reasonable approximation is that the
euro area policy rate is exogenous and that the nominal exchange rate is ﬁxed.
The foreign nominal interest rate determines the domestic nominal interest
rate up to the UIP condition. On the balanced growth path, inﬂation is set at
2.0% in accord with the inﬂation target of the ECB.
Price markup and the share price-to-equity ratio are roughly in accord
with empirical evidence,18 while capital share parameter and elasticity of
substitution between capital and labour have been estimated from historical
data by Ripatti and Vilmunen (2001). Capital depreciation rate is set to 8 %
per annum.
Finally, table (5) summarizes key ‘great ratios’, factor shares, net foreign asset
position and employment rates at initial equilibrium. Comparison with recent
data shows that the model ﬁts the data reasonable well. The model’s current
calibration, however, involves some diﬃculties in capturing the relatively low
investment and private consumption shares observed in the data.
3.3 Policy experiments
In order to facilitate analysis of fairly complex general equilibrium eﬀects
associated with ageing and diﬀerent assumptions that can be made as to
18Kilponen and Santavirta (2005) estimate from microdata that the percentage share of
operating proﬁts in the value of gross output in Finnish manufacturing ﬁrms was roughly
8% during the last decade.
27Variable Explanation Value
¯ RF/ ˆ Pc Real interest rate, p.a., variable 2.4
b Y Output growth rate, p.a., variable 2.3
ˆ ΛL Labour saving technical change p.a., parameter 2.08
δ
K Capital depreciation rate, parameter 0.08
Υ Price markup, parameter 1.08
¯ AF/¯ Π Price to equity ratio, variable 15.0
δ capital share parameter 0.1
ρ El. of substitution between capital and labour 0.72






cH Private consumption share,% 51.35 4 .0
i Private investment rate,% 15.81 8 .6
x Export share,% 39.83 4 .0
m Import share,% 31.13 4 .0
ls Labour share,% 49.55 1 .5
k/l Capital intensity 4.84 .3
aw Net foreign assets, % −42.5 −23.3
l Employment rate, % 58.65 5 .4
lw Workers 56.65 3 .8
lr Retirees 2.15 .2
Shares calculated in nominal terms except for capital intensity
Table 5: Great ratios, factor shares and participation rates
pension parameters, we designed some alternative demographic scenarios and
policy experiments. The long-run implications of ageing population are treated
as shocks to the initial state of unchanged demographic age structure and
steady pace of population growth. We performed ﬁve diﬀerent simulations
altogether, as reported in table 6.
The shock simulating population ageing incorporated both the higher life
expectancy projected in the population forecast and the slowdown in the
growth of working-age population. Higher life expectancy was simulated by
increasing the expected period of retirement by 5 years (table 6, columns I—II)
and then supplementing the shock with a longer expected working time of 2.5
years, while taking into account the slow down of the growth of working age
population (table 6, column III).
Experiment II is a pure demographic shock that captures the main
demographic trends. According to the latest population prognoses, the fastest
growth in the old age dependency ratio will take place in the 2020s and 2030s,
when the baby boom generation, born after the second world war, retires.
After that, the ratio will grow at a slower pace. The overall dependency
ratio is projected to level oﬀ by the 2030s. Immigration is forecast to remain
28Experiment
Change I II III IV V
Expected period of retirement, years 5.05 .05 .05 .05 .0
Growth rate of workers, % annually −0.5 −0.5 −0.5 −0.5
Expected working time, years 2.52 .52 .5
Pension replacement rate, % -points −10.0 μ*
*endogenous
Table 6: Demographics shocks relative to initial steady state
insigniﬁcant, at only 5000 persons a year net. Finally, according to Statistics
Finland estimates, the life expectancy for men will rise from the current 75.1
years to 82.1 years by 2040. For women the corresponding ﬁgures are 81.8 and
86.8 years.
Features inherent in the pension scheme, ie deferred retirement in
response to accelerated accrual and a lower replacement rate, were built
into the demographic eﬀects by lowering the pension replacement rate by
10 percentage points (column IV). The analysis was completed with an
equilibrium calculation where the replacement rate was endogenously deﬁned
while the rate of employee contribution was kept unchanged, at its initial
steady state level (column V).
4 Long-run eﬀects of ageing
4.1 Increasing life expectancy
Increase in life expectancy projected in the demographic forecast for Finland
alone would have a pronounced eﬀect on the economy’s long-run equilibrium.
Extension of the period of retirement by ﬁve years, as assumed in the
calculation, would imply an increase in the old-age dependency ratio of 11
percentage points. This would lead to 6.3 percentage point increase in total
pension expenditures relative to total wages. Tax burden on labour would
raise by more than 3.7 percentage points and would be reﬂe c t e di nf a l l i n g
employment rates. The total contribution rate would rise by 6.7 percentage
points. (table 7, column I). Given age cohorts of the same size and a stable
fertility rate, higher life expectancy alone would impose a considerable burden
on the economy. The falling employment rate of workers is attributable
to a higher tax burden on labour, so thatt h ea f t e r - t a xw a g er a t ed e c l i n e s
slightly. These factors are reﬂected in rising real wages in the long-run. The
consumption response, measured as a share of output, reﬂects households’
diﬀerent marginal propensities to consume. Retirees own a larger share of the
economy’s ﬁnancial wealth and are more willing than workers to consume it.
Mirror eﬀect of this is that capital share is higher in the aged economy.
29Final steady-state, change
Variable Explanation I II III IV V
ϕ Old-age dependency ratio** 10.9 15.5 13.0 13.0 13.9
tP Contribution rate** 6.7 8.8 7.0 1.3 a)0.0
employee 1.4 1.8 1.4 .3 a)0.0
employer 5.4 7.0 5.6 1.0 a)0.0
tWS Labour income tax rate** 2.3 5.0 3.4 0 -0.7
T R
WL Pension expenditure/wage sum** 5.3 8.0 6.7 2.0 1.0
w c)Real wage* 5.4 5.3 6.0 9.5 10.3
(1 − t)w c)After-tax real wage* -0.38 -5.6 -1.6 9.5 11.5
cH Private consumption share* 5.1 6.2 6.4 6.8 13.6
λ Wealth distribution** 3.4 6.1 5.2 5.5 5.6
l Employment rate** -3.7 -5.7 -4.7 -3.3 -3.0
lw Workers -4.3 -6.2 -5.2 -4.3 -4.2
lr Retirees 2.1 1.8 1.6 3.5 3.7
k Capital share* 21.0 23.5 22.4 21.1 21.0
aw Net foreign assets** 4.8 21.1 27.1 51.2 56.7
μ Pension replacement rate** 000 - 1 0 . 0 b)-12.0
y Output, eﬃciency units -1.7 -5.5 -3.4 -0.5 0.12
* Percentage change relative to initial steady state
** Change, percentage points relative to initial steady state
a) Contribution rate kept ﬁxed at initial steady state, b) endogenous, c) in eﬃciency units
Table 7: Long-run eﬀects of ageing
4.2 Declining fertility rate
Considering that age cohorts entering the labour market are smaller than
those withdrawing, the old-age dependency ratio would increase by almost
16 percentage points (table 7, column II). Tax rate and employment responses
would also be pronounced, in that the pension contribution rate would increase
b y8 . 8p e r c e n t a g ep o i n t sa n dt h ei n c o m et a xr a t eb y3 . 4p e r c e n t a g ep o i n t s .T h e
employment rate would fall by almost 6 percentage points reﬂe c t i n gam a r k e d
increase in real wages. The private consumption share would increase by 6.2
percentage points relative to the initial state of constant population growth.
The major increase in tax rates is related not only to pension expenditures
but also to the strong response of workers’ employment rates. This reduces
tax bases, even if retirees supply more labour. Retirees positive labour supply
response is attributable to a longer retirement period.
4.3 Pension reform and a lower replacement rate
It has been estimated that the pension reform will extend labour force
participation by an average of 2—3 years. This alone would clearly ease the
burden of an ageing population (table 7, column III). The need to increase the
contribution would be reduced by 1.8 percentage points. Similarly, the need
30to raise the labour income tax rate would decrease almost as much, compared
to the pure demographic shock. This would in turn be reﬂected in smaller
employment losses in the long-run.
The decline in average replacement induced by the rules of pension
indexation also has a considerable eﬀect on sustainability of the pension
scheme. This eﬀect was measured by the assumption that the ratio of average
pension to average wage would decline by 10 percentage points, ie. clearly
less than that suggested by the calculation discussed above. This would
considerably reduce the need to raise the contribution rate in response to
population ageing in the long-run. The labour income tax rate could be kept
at the current level, and contribution rates would need to be raised only by
1.3 percentage points. (7, column IV). Pension expenditure would raise 4.7
percentage points less than the ﬁgure returned by the previous simulation
(column III).
According to the results of the equilibrium calculation based on given rate
of contribution, we ﬁnd that pensions would, in the long-run, have to decline
from their current levels by 12 percentage points relative to average wages
(table 7, column V). This would ensure that the ratio of pension expenditure
would increase only by 1% percentage point relative to total wages in response
to population ageing. However, real wages would still increase by 10%, while
the employment rate would fall by 3 percentage points. Once more, retirees
incentives to work would be improved, primarily because of the wealth eﬀect
compared to the previous experiment. Finally output would remain virtually
intact in this case.
5D y n a m i c e ﬀects
Dynamic optimization and perfect foresight assumption implies that the
transition paths of the macroeconomic variables reﬂect the way in which
optimizing agents prepare for a new demographic situation. These adjustment
paths are further complicated by our assumption that demographic structure
is changing over time. The adjustment paths can typically involve over- or
undershooting of forward looking variables, even though the transitional path
of a demographic shock is a smooth slowly evolving process. One such variable
is consumption, which typically initially jumps and then begins gradually
to adjust to the new long-run steady state. This is reﬂe c t e di no v e r -o r
undershooting of wages and employment, given that leisure and consumption
are non-separable in the periodic utility.
Figure 1 shows how the model economy responds to a pure anticipated
shock to retirement age (I) and to the shock where the fertility rate drops as
described in experiment II.19
After a temporary drop in distribution of wealth (in favour of workers),
retirees eventually hold a larger share of the economy’s ﬁnancial wealth.
The worker’s tax burden on labour follows a similar pattern. Aggregate
consumption reacts in advance of anticipated demographic change and starts
19All the simulations were done using DYNARE, version 3.051.
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Figure 1: Pure demographic shocks and transition.
Blue line corresponds to experiment I and red line (lighter grey) to experiment
II. Periods are quarters.
stabilizing well before the demographic change is over. Beyond the response
of aggregate consumption, there are opposite responses of retirees and
workers. While the workers increase saving for retirement by reducing their
consumption, and also because of a higher tax burden, retirees respond
positively. Retirees are also now more numerous as shown by the gradual
rise in the dependency ratio. A lower fertility rate, besides increasing life
expectancy, gradually increases the dependency ratio and leads to a further
increase in the pension contribution rate. This eﬀect is also associated with a
slightly higher consumption share and lower employment rate.20
Figure 2 illustrates how an extension of working life and a lower replacement
rate alleviate the eﬀects of a pure demographic shock. Consumption share
is practically intact (red (lighter gray) line), while the need to increase
contribution rates gradually ease along with a less pronounced increase in
the dependency ratio. Capital share increases initially with the extension
of working life but eventually returns to a very close to the same level as
with a pure demographic shock. Longer working time means that there is a
roughly one percentage point improvement in employment rate compared to
a pure demographic shock. Extending the simulation by taking into account
also a lower pension replacement rate shows that the consumption share may
20Higher capital and consumption shares in the long-run are compatible with the
Blanchard-Yaari asset market equilibrium condition. In essence, the condition produces
a positive relationship between consumption and capital stock, as required by the current
account balance in an open economy.












































Figure 2: Extensions of working life and lower replacement rate ease ﬁscal
burden of ageing.
Red line (lighter grey) corresponds to experiment III, blue line to experiment
IV; baseline is a pure demographic shock; periods are quarters.
now fall in the short and medium term. A drop in the replacement rate
reduces pensioners’ permanent income, with a subsequent temporary fall in
consumption levels. As the need to raise the contribution rate gradually eases,
employment improves rather quickly, while consumption bounces back only
after a several decades. Mirroring this, there is also a temporary fall in capital
share and a permanent fall in distribution of wealth held by the retirees.21
5.1 Demographic uncertainty
Population scenarios and ageing reﬂect projected changes in fertility rates
and longevity. These population scenarios are however subject to much
uncertainty. OECD (2005) has reported that in the case of Finland, overall
21These results are naturally subject to uncertainty regarding calibrated and estimated
parameter values of the model, as well as assumptions on the external environment of the
economy and demographic projections. In particular intertemporal substitution (σ)a n d
elasticity of periodic utility with respect to consumption (ν) guide the dynamic and long
run response of consumption, real wages and employment, which in turn matter how the
tax burden on labour evolves in response to population ageing. Subsequent sensitivity
analysis shows that a higher value of intertemporal substitution mitigates the eﬀects of pure
demographic shock on taxes, while the opposite is true for lower values of σ. Parameter ν
aﬀects primarily on the long-run response of the economy to population ageing as well as the
initial steady state. Sensitivity analysis suggests that higher values of ν lead to somewhat
smaller response of the contribution rate which in turn is associated with a slightly smaller
n e g a t i v er e s p o n s eo fe m p l o y m e n t .
33uncertainty surrounding longevity and fertility rate projections suggests that
the dependency ratio will ﬂuctuate ±10 percentage points around the oﬃcial
scenario.22 Rather similar results were obtained in the project ‘Uncertain
Population of Europe’ (UPE) funded by the EU Commission. In this
project, stochastic population forecasts were generated by simulating 3,000
alternative paths of future development for age-speciﬁc mortality, fertility and
net migration for diﬀerent European countries. These diﬀerent scenarios were
then combined into population scenarios using the classical cohort-component
book-keeping equations. Based on the resulting age-speciﬁc cohort tables from
diﬀerent simulations, table 8 summarizes the statics related to the old-age
dependency ratio relevant to the model. This helps us anchor the degree
of uncertainty related to the old-age dependency ratio in Finland and thus
quantify the degree of uncertainty related to demographic trends. The table
suggests that risks of making large errors in population forecasts increase after
2020, making the conﬁdence limits expand quite fast (see also Alho (1998)).
Year Min Mean Max S.E.
2010 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.005
2020 0.48 0.54 0.61 0.019
2030 0.49 0.64 0.74 0.043
2040 0.41 0.65 0.94 0.071
2050 0.36 0.67 1.08 0.099
Table 8: Summary statistics from stochastic population simulations (based on
own calculations from http://www.stat.ﬁ/tup/euupe/ )
In order to quantify how the demographic uncertainty feeds into the model’s
outcomes, we take experiment III as a baseline (see table 6), but allow for
stochastic variation in retirement probability (1 − ωt), survival probability
(γt) and worker’s growth rate ˆ Nw
t . Allowing for stochastic variation in these
variables generates stochastic variation for the model’s endogenous variables
along the transition path.23 We calibrate the uncertainty in retirement
probability and survival probability such that the 90% conﬁdence intervals
for working time and retirement are respectively ±2 and ±4 years at the
ﬁnal steady state of the model. Furthermore, we assume that the population
growth rate has a 90% conﬁdence interval of 0.5% in annual terms. This
generates empirically plausible variation in dependency ratio, amounting to a
4% standard error. Figure (3) shows the 90% conﬁdence intervals generated
by these assumptions on the relevant demographic variables, while table 9
summarizes the results for selected endogenous variables at the ﬁnal steady
state.
22Assessing the robustness of demographic projections in OECD countries, Frederic
Gonand, Economics Department Working Papers, No. 464, OECD)
23DYNARE’s functions forecast and stoch_simul allow mixing of deterministic and
stochastic shocks.We are indebted to Michel Juillard for developing these functions.
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Figure 3: Mean outcome and 90% conﬁdence intervals generated by
the stochastic variation in retirement probability, survival probability and
population growth rate.
It is evident that there much uncertainty about economic outcomes of
the model, once uncertainty as to demographic structure is accounted for.
A standard error of 4% for the dependency ratio translates to roughly a 3
percentage point standard error in the labour income tax and contribution
rates. Variation in the employment rate is roughly 2 percentage points.
Stochastic simulations allows us also to quantify the relative importance
of diﬀerent demographic shocks to economic outcomes. This can be done by
looking at (asymptotic) variance decomposition as generated by the stochastic
simulations of the model. Although the results of variance decomposition
depend on the assumed relative standard errors of the shocks, columns 5—7
in table 9 clearly suggest that lengthening the working time has rather minor
eﬀect on alleviating the ﬁscal burden of ageing: Only about 3% of the stochastic
variation in the contribution rate is explained by the variation in working
period. Stochastic variation in the time spent in retirement is clearly more
important.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
As industrialized countries prepare for population ageing, pension reforms have
been designed with the aim on increasing incentives to work longer and/or
cutting pension beneﬁts. One prominent example from Europe is Finland,
where the latest pension reform introduced a ﬂexible retirement age of between
63 and 68.
Using a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model calibrated to Finland,








ϕ Dependency ratio 0.46 0.04 3.7 3.8 92.5
tP Contribution rate 0.28 0.03 3.7 1.6 94.7
tWS Labour income tax rate 0.42 0.03 3.7 2.1 94.2
T R
WL Pension exp/wage sum 0.28 0.02 3.6 3.9 92.4
y Output, eﬃciency units 0.18 0.01 3.6 1.9 92.4
L/N Employment rate 0.49 0.02 3.5 2.8 93.7
4(1− ω)
−1 Working time, years 45.5 1.2
4(1 − γ)−1 Retirement, years 19.4 2.5
ˆ NW
t Growth rate of workers -.33 0.3
a) All the moments are evaluated at ﬁnal steady state
Table 9: Asymptotic moments from stochastic model simulations for selected
model’s variables
the burden from pension payments alone would cause the income tax rate
to rise to a level above that witnessed in the worst years of recession in the
mid-1990s. A stochastic simulation exercise suggests also that lengthening the
working time has a rather minor impact on alleviating the ﬁscal burden of
ageing: only a minor part of the stochastic variation in the contribution rate
is explained by the variation in working period.
On the contrary, if the replacement rate falls, as seems likely under the
current pension regime, there would be a much smaller increase in taxation
in response to growing expenditure on pensions. The average decline in
the level of pensions relative to wage developments in turn raises several
concerns. In Finland, where supplementary pension funds are of minor
importance by international standards there is a risk that the falling purchasing
power of pensions relative to wage developments will exert pressure on other
social security schemes. The employee pension scheme, which appears to be
ﬁnancially sustainable, may thus in practice generate costs to local and central
government in the form of higher expenditure on income support and other
beneﬁts.
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